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NOTE
An Examination of Compensation Terms in the
United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty
by Saul Aronson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
O ne of the greatest concerns of U.S. investors abroad is the possible
expropriation of property by a foreign government, particularly in
less developed areas of the world.1 Two reports demonstrate that these
fears may be well founded. A late 1960's study of the Fortune 500 found
that 187 companies had experienced an expropriation since the end of
World War 1.2 The U.S. State Department reported in another study that
between July of 1971 and July of 1973 there were at least 86 instances of
expropriation of American investment interests.3
As a result of this problem, foreign investors are unlikely to invest in
lesser developed nations unless basic conditions of investment protection
are satisfied. Developing nations that are unable to meet these invest-
ment protection requirements endure harsh economic consequences. Al-
though in need of foreign investment, such as technology and capital,
these countries find it increasingly difficult to attract direct foreign in-
vestment unless they provide a favorable and secure investing environ-
ment to the overseas investor.4
In an attempt to protect U.S. foreign investment, the U.S. govern-
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1984); B.A., State
University of New York at Albany (1981).
1 Pedersen, Expropriation in International Law-Strategies of Avoidance and Re-
dress, 10 U. TOL. L. Rav. 73 (1978).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 AERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ASLAN-AsmCAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE,
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INvEsTMEENTs 8-10 (1982) (report prepared for conference on
Nov. 3, 1982).
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ment has negotiated, since the end of World War II, a total of 44 trea-
ties.8 These have included provisions for the protection and treatment of
direct foreign investments.' These agreements, known as Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, were extremely helpful to the
U.S. overseas investor in the years immediately proceeding World War II(1946-56) .
These treaties, however, may now no longer be appropriate for the
rapid commercial expansion of today's investing world.8 A major problem
with the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is that they
are not limited exclusively to the protection of foreign investments, but
rather, generally emphasize the protection of American citizens abroad.9
Consequently, they are often complex and overbroad, thereby detracting
from their effectiveness as an investment protection device. 10 The U.S.
government responded to this problem in 1982 when it concluded its first
Bilateral Investment Treaty with the government of Egypt."' The Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty with Egypt is different from its predecessor, the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, because of its focus on the
protection of foreign investments.12
The purpose of this note is to examine the efficacy of the compensa-
tion terms of the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty and to deter-
mine whether the Treaty-provides improved legal protection to the U.S.
foreign investor in the event of expropriation of U.S. interests in Egypt.
B. Problems of Compensation Under International Law
The major problem of compensation under international law is the
question of which rule of compensation should be used when foreign as-
sets have been expropriated by a host country. The three competing
5 Asken, The Case For Bilateral Investment Treaties, in PRivATE INvESTORS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BusNmss 357, 358-59 (M. Landwehr
ed. 1981).
8 See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-
Thailand, art. E1(2), 19 U.S.T. 5843, 5847, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Convention of Establishment,
Nov. 25, 1959, United States-France, art. IV(3), 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 4625;
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, United States-Pakistan, art. VI, 12
U.S.T. 110, 113, T.LA.S. No. 4683; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar.
27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, art. VI(4), 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2051, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
7 Asken, supra note 5, at 367.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 368.
10 Id. at 371.
11 Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments,
Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 927 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty].
22 Id. at 930-34 (art. H).
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views are: (1) the traditional view; (2) the emerging view, as set forth by
Professor Ignatz Seidi-Hohenveldern; and, (3) the Third World view.
The traditional view of compensation, supported primarily by the
western industrialized nations, is that the expropriating state must pay
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation to the deprived property
owner.' 3 This rule has been upheld and interpreted by international
courts and tribunals to require that compensation be equal to the fair
market value of the property concerned 14 and loss of anticipated profits.' 5
In Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Com-
pany,16 the arbitrator concluded:
According to the generally held view, the object of damages is to
place the party to whom they are awarded in the same pecuniary posi-
tion that they would have been in if the contract had been performed in
the manner provided for by the parties at the time of its conclusion....
This compensation includes the loss suffered (damnum emergens), for
example the expenses incurred in performing the contract, and the profit
lost (lucrum cessans), for example the net profit which the contract
would have produced.17
Furthermore, in Norwegian Shipowners' Claims,' the Permanent Court
of Arbitration Tribunal stated: "Just compensation implies a complete
restitution of the -status quo ante, based not upon future gains of the
United States or other powers, but upon the loss of profits of the Norwe-
gian owners as compared with other owners of similar property."' 9
In addition to the traditional view, a new rule of compensation is
emerging under customary international law: "[W]here a State takes the
property of foreigners, such persons are entitled to compensation, even if
nationals of the State concerned obtain no compensation at all, or only
inadequate compensation; yet, the compensation due to the foreign own-
ers does not necessarily amount to full compensation. 2 0 The proponents
of this standard believe that it is replacing the traditional rule of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation. In support of this contention they
13 Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian Practice on Lump Sum Compensation by Treaty, 70
AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 766 (1976).
U Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 309, 334, 340
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922).
" Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 LL.R. 136,
185-186 (1963).
16 Id.
17 Id.
"8 Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 390.
"9 Id. at 338.
20 Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Social Function of Property and Property Protection in
Present Day International Law, in EssAYs ON rnH DEvELoPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 77, 95-96 (F. Kalshoven, P. Kuyper & J. Lammers eds. 1980).
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refer to the Austrian government lump-sum settlement treaties signed af-
ter World War 11.21
A third standard of compensation, which is followed primarily by de-
veloping nations, is articulated in the United Nations Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States: "[A]ppropriate compensation should
be paid by the state adopting such measures [i.e., expropriation, national-
ization], taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all cir-
cumstances that the State considers pertinent."2 One Third World au-
thor even suggests that compensation should be limited solely to the
scrap value of the installations concerned, arguing that industrialized na-
tions have a responsibility to pay back damages inflicted by them on
lesser developed countries during the colonial period .2  The conflicting
views of compensation held by industrial and developing nations are a
source of continuing controversy.
C. The U.S. Position Regarding Compensation
The U.S. government position is that compensation for property ex-
propriated by a foreign government must be prompt, adequate and effec-
tive. The Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law defines adequate
as meaning "the full value of property taken, together with interest to the
date of payment. ' ' 24 Furthermore, the U.S. State Department has stated
that the "acceptance by U.S. nationals of less than fair market value does
not constitute acceptance of any other standard by the U.S. govern-
ment. '25 Payment with reasonable promptness is defined by the Second
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law as meaning "payment as soon as is
reasonable under the circumstances. '2 The Official Comments clarify
this definition by stating that:
[P]rovision for determining compensation must exist at the time of the
21 Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 13, at 766.
2 G.A: Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (art.
2(2)(c)). The U.N. Resolution has a nonbinding effect. Furthermore, it was not supported by
the western industrialized nations. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 20, at 91-92.
23 Girvon, Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensation Criteria From a Third
World Viewpoint, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
168 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIE UNITED STATES § 188
(1965). Full value is defined as "fair market value if ascertainable" and it "must be deter-
mined as of the time of taking, unaffected by the taking or other related takings, or by
conduct attributable to the taking state and having the effect of depressing the value of the
property in anticipation of the taking." Id.
25 U.S. Policy on Foreign Investment and Nationalization Reiterated, 74 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 138 (1976).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 189
(1965).
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taking. It must include provision for determination within a reasonable
time and for payment promptly after determination.
Payment in state bonds ...does not satisfy the requirement of
promptness unless the maturity date of the bonds is within a reasonable
time under the circumstances.2 7
Effective compensation is also defined by the Second Restatement of For-
eign Relations Law, which states that compensation must be in an "effec-
tively realizable form [requiring payment] in the form of cash or property
readily convertible into cash." '2 8
II. COMPENSATION PROBLEMS UNDER CURRENT U.S. INVESTMENT
PROTECTION TREATIES
A. Difficulties with the Standard of Compensation of U.S. Investment
Treaties
Typically, the compensation provision of a U.S. investment treaty re-
quires that "property shall not be taken... without the prompt payment
of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realiz-
able form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken. '2 9
Reliance on such a general standard, however, has done little to clarify
such difficult questions as how much compensation is "adequate," how
prompt is "prompt," and what form is "effective." As one author has
written: "[G]eneral principles will not help much .... [R]esort to gen-
eralities such as 'prompt, adequate, and effective'... are far more likely
to obscure thought, comfort the parties with notions of ideological cer-
tainty and moral perfection, and inspire them to dig their trenches
deeper."o
Two major difficulties exist with the current U.S. treaty standard of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. First, the standard does
17 Id. § 189 comments a and b.
28 Id. § 190.
If not in the currency of the state of which the alien was a national at the time of
taking, the cash paid must be convertible into such currency and withdrawable,
either before or after conversion, to the territory of the state of the alien's nation-
ality, except... [sluch conversion... may be delayed to the minimum extent
necessary to assure the availability of foreign exchange for goods and services es-
sential to the health and welfare of the people of the taking state.Id.
29 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, art. IV(2), 8 U.S.T. 899, 903, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Iran
Treaty].
30 Rogers, Foreward, to 1 Tan VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw at viii (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
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not effectively articulate the minimum level of compensation expected by
the U.S. government. Second, the standard does not offer a solution to
the extremely complex problem of valuation, thereby leaving the U.S. for-
eign investor vulnerable to the possibility of improper or unfair methods
of valuation by the depriving state.
B. Application of the Prompt, Adequate and Effective Standard of
Compensation
The terms of the traditional compensation standard are not defined
by a rigid formula, but rather by the peculiarities of each case. For exam-
ple, the word "prompt," "anticipates immediate recovery, whether the
deprivation be limited or extensive. 3 1 International tribunals have held it
to mean payment made "'as rapidly as possible,' 'without undue delay,'
or within a 'reasonable time.' "32 Actual practice, however, is inconsistent
with the theory of immediate payment, "emphasizing instead the de-
ferred character of compensation. 3 3 Often the expropriating state will re-
sort to delaying tactics in order to forestall paying its obligation or to
encourage settlement at a lower figure.3'
The term "effective" has traditionally meant the payment of com-
pensation "in a medium of exchange of maximum value to the deprived
alien, preferably his own legal currency. '3 5 But in actuality, depriving
states have engaged in practices not conforming to the conventional defi-
nition of "effective." Such practices include not paying obligations due to
31 Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal Standard of
Compensation?, 30 FORDHAm L. REv. 727, 736-40 (1962). "[S]ome of its adherents [have]
even insist[ed] on prior payment." Id. at 736.
3' Pedersen, supra note 1, at 94. See also Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, 1 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards at 337 (payment to be made without undue delay).
33 Dawson & Weston, supra note 31, at 766. The prompt payment standard can be
realistically applied in limited deprivations since the amount involved would presumably be
insignificant enough to permit swift payment. However, in extensive deprivations, prompt
payment becomes almost impossible because the depriving state usually lacks the resources
necessary for compliance. Id. at 737.
3 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 94. Three examples are given. First, "[t]he Chilean Act
which nationalized American copper companies in 1971 provided for payment over an ex-
tended period not to exceed thirty years." Id. at 94 n.98. Second, "[flollowing an expropria-
tion in Guatemala, an offer of payment was made in bonds to mature in twenty-five years,
interest on which was to accrue at three percent per annum." Id. Third, "[t]he Cuban offer
of compensation following expropriations in the early 1960's provided for payment in thirty
year bonds, both the interest and principle of which were to be paid out of revenues re-
ceived from the sales of sugar to the United States." Id.
U Dawson & Weston, supra note 31, at 738. See Case of S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1, at 32 (Judgment of Aug. 17, 1923). Bonds may be acceptable if they
appear sound and have prompt maturation dates. Pederson, supra note 1, at 96.
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an inability or unwillingness to pay' and manipulating the medium of
payment particularly when the currency involved is subject to a high de-
gree of exchange fluctuation.3 7
The term most subject to dispute, "adequate," traditionally obligates
the taking state to provide recompense to the former owners of the seized
property in an amount equal to the fair market value of the property at
the time of taking.38 This rule is supported by international tribunals.3'
However, such standards as fair, just or appropriate compensation do not
specify how compensation is to be calculated, other than to say that it
should be less than full and more than nothing.40 Even when compensa-
tion formulas have been acknowledged, they have not always been prop-
erly applied.41 The fair market value standard has been criticized on ac-
count of: (1) vagueness;42 (2) an absence of a market for the usual type of
", Dawson & Weston, supra note 31, at 738-39. While limited takings should be made
in "hard" or the most available currency, extensive takings introduce difficulties of larger
proportion due to the vastness of the taking. In such instances claimant states have been
forced to accept payment in government bonds, redeemable in soft currencies, which may be
of little value at maturation date due to inflation, devaluation, inconvertability or general
monetary instability. Id. at 739.
37 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 95.
-" Id. at 86.
3, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.LJ., ser. A, No. 17,
at 47 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928).
40 Baxter, Foreward, to 2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw at viii (R. Lillich ed. 1972). The absence of generally accepted guidelines to property
valuation is due to a general reluctance at the international level to express a methodology
used in calculating a compensation amount. For example, The Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States, a national claims program whose task is primarily to cal-
culate value within the international context, has rarely acknowledged the method of valua-
tion employed in determining awards. This lack of an articulated standard has also been
characteristic of British and French national claims commissions set up to distribute lump
sum settlements to qualified claimants. Smith, Real Property Valuation for Foreign
Wealth-Deprivations, in 1 Tim VALUATION OF NATIONALZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 133 n.3 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
41 Smith, supra note 40, at 133-34 n.3.
The American-Turkish Claims Commission under the agreement of December 24,
1923, presents the classic example of such improper application in Christo Piro-
caco v. Republic of Turkey. The claimant has asserted a value for certain property
in excess of $50,000. The Commission first multiplied the purchase price for the
property, as stated in the deed, by a coefficient adopted from the practice of the
Turkish-Greek Commission and arrived at a sum of $3,520. The Commission then
adopted the study of the American Consul General, which had capitalized rental
value, and arrived at a sum of $10,971.42. The Commission then averaged these
two figures and obtained a figure of $7,245.71. The Commission, in a final step,
estimated damage by deducting the value of the property, as stated in a tax as-
sessment, from the above figure and awarded the claimant $6,030.01.
Id.
41 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 87.
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enterprise investment; s (3) more acute difficulties for the depriving state
when takings are extensive;44 (4) reduced fair market value of an asset
resulting from government actions, such as prior notice of expropriating,
thereby reducing the amount of compensation; 45 and, (5) the fact that
although the fair market value standard may be appropriate for measur-
ing a small, locally established firm, multinational firms require a more
sophisticated form of evaluation. 6
1. The U.S. Government Approach to Calculating Fair Market
Value and Relevant Criticisms
The U.S. government has three methods to determine fair market
value: (1) the going-concern approach; (2) the replacement cost of prop-
erty approach; and, (3) the book value approach.
The going-concern approach is a method which attempts to measure
earning power and therefore encompasses elements such as loss of future
profits, which may be based on projections of past earnings or estimates
of future earnings. 47 This method has several problems in application.
First, it can be difficult or unfair to apply "where the expropriated enter-
prise lacks an earnings history which is sufficiently long for accurate pre-
diction.' 48 Second, the earning power of an enterprise is vulnerable to
actions of the host state which affect profit in a negative way,'9 such as
tax increases, threat of contract cancellation or withdrawal of privileges.5 0
And third, compensation can vary considerably depending on how capi-
talization is applied.51 In these situations the U.S. government recognizes
that this method may be impracticable.2
In addition to the going-concern approach, the U.S. government also
43 Id. at 87-88. "While in other contexts, salds of similar products or things could be
used for determination of their value in the relevant market, there will seldom be sales of
similar enterprises to be used for comparison. Thus, 'market value' is not a directly ascer-
tainable amount. Accordingly, it must be approximated." Id. at 88.
" Dawson & Weston, supra note 31, at 738. "Extensive deprivations may be of such ...
magnitude as to render 'full' compensation truely impossible .... Moreover, recent opinion
and practice suggest that 'partial' compensation in this context has become more the norm
than the exception." Id.
4 Wesley, Establishing Minimum Compensation Criteria for Use in Expropriation
Disputes, 25 VAND. L. Rlv. 939, 959 (1972).
41 Id. at 960. Market conditions do not accurately measure value in this instance be-
cause of the imperfect competitive market conditions of the multinational corporation. Id.
47 Smith, The U.S. Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in De-
veloping Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRmSNAT'L L. 517, 519 (1976).
4' Pedersen, supra note 1, at 88.
49 Id. at 89.
"' Smith, supra note 47, at 519.
51 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 89.
51 Smith, supra note 47, at 519.
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accepts the use of the replacement cost of property approach when appro-
priate.53 Under this method, compensation equals the replacement cost of
property at the time of the expropriation less actual depreciation." The
advantage of this approach is that it is simpler to apply than the going-
concern approach, and it yields results which are relatively equitable,
consistent and predictable.5 The major defects are that it does not take
into account earning capacity, is of little use in valuing intangibles," and
does not reflect the market conditions and technology that can change
between the time when an asset is put into operation and the time of
valuation. 57 In addition, it does not measure the real loss to the investor,
which is in terms of lost opportunities since an investor cannot replace
opportunities by replacing lost assets.58
The final method employed by the U.S. government is the book-
value approach, which values assets at acquisition cost less depreciation. 59
The major objection to this method is that it bears little relation to the
actual value of the investment as the time increases between the estab-
lishment of the enterprise and the expropriation although it is possible
that the value of the investment may increase.6 0
The reader will better understand the complex problems of applying
the prompt, adequate and effective standard of compensation upon exam-
ination of two recent case examples.
2. The French Nationalization Cases
At the center of President Francois Mitterand's political and eco-
nomic changes is the controversial $7.4 billion nationalization of major
industries and banking institutions." Although foreign firms are specifi-
11 Id. This method is less acceptable to the United States than the going-concern ap-
proach. Id.
54 Id.
55 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 89.
" Smith, supra note 47, at 519.
1, Weigel & Weston, Valuation Upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-
Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law, in 1 THE
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 16 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
58 Id.
, Smith, supra note 47, at 519. This is the least acceptable method of valuation to the
U.S. government. Id.
11 Pedersen, supra note 1, at 90.
Borde & Eggleston, The French Nationalizations, 68 A.B.A. J. 422 (1982).
[S]hareholders of each of the publicly traded nationalized concerns [were entitled]
to receive, for each share nationalized, the highest average monthly opening stock
market quotation during the six-month period ending March 31, 1981, as in-
creased by 14 per cent to compensate for France's inflation rate in 1981. In addi-
tion, the shareholders will receive, in lieu of 1981 dividends, a.bonus equivalent to
the per share dividends made by the' nationalized concern in 1980, again as in-
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cally excluded from the nationalization program, foreign minority share-
holders in French banks and industries were not excluded.2 This section
examines the implications of the indemnification scheme for American
minority shareholders.
The Convention of Establishments3 states in article IV that:
Property of nationals and companies of either . . . Party shall not be
expropriated... except for a public purpose and with payment of a just
compensation. Such compensation shall represent the equivalent of the
property taken; it shall be accorded in an effectively realizable form and
without needless delay. Adequate provision for the determination and
payment of ... compensation must have been made no later than the
time of taking."
In addition to article IV, section 5 of the Protocol provides that "the term
'expropriated... for a public purpose' extends inter alia to nationaliza-
tions. '65 And section 6 of the Protocol states that provisions providing for
payment of compensation "shall extend to interests held directly or indi-
rectly by nationals and companies of either... Party in property expro-
priated within the territory of the other ... Party."6
France claims that the indemnification paid to American sharehold-
ers will meet the fair market value criteria provided for in the Convention
of Establishment.6 7 The first plan of indemnification provided by the
French government was declared unconstitutional by France's highest ju-
dicial body, the Constitutional Council.68 The second indemnification
scheme, however, was quickly approved by the Constitutional Council
and called for compensation based exclusively on stock market exchange
prices.6 9
Indemnification was to be paid in the form of state bonds issued
creased by a 14 per cent inflation adjustment.
As for the 21 banks not publicly traded, the definitive Nationalization Law
creates an Administrative Commission that must determine, no later than June
30, 1982, the amount of indemnification to be paid by analyzing the value of the
shares nationalized as of December 31, 1981, and correcting that for inflation and
other economic events during the first semester of 1982.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 425.
6 Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, United States-France, 11 U.S.T. 2398,
T.I.A.S. No. 4625.
64 Id. at 2403.
65 Id. at 2421.
68 Id.
67 Borde & Eggleston, supra note 61, at 427.
68 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1982, at 10, col. 3. The Council's principle objection to the plan
was the fact that dividends for 1981 had been suspended and were not included in the
indemnification scheme. Id.
" Borde & Eggleston, supra note 61, at 426.
Vol. 16:287
within three months from the effective date of the Nationalization law."
Shareholders were given, in exchange for their shares, negotiable bonds
issued by the National Industrial Fund and guaranteed by the govern-
ment of France.7 1 Interest on the bonds is to be paid semi-annually and is
set equal to the rate in effect for the long term government debt obliga-
tions. 7 2 The National Industrial Fund is to redeem the bonds pursuant to
a lottery draw conducted once per year for fifteen years. 3
The French indemnification scheme exemplifies the difficulties of ap-
plying the prompt, adequate and effective compensation standard. The
plan most likely fails to meet the requirements of adequate payment for
several reasons. First, "although higher than before, the compensation to
be received by shareholders remains below ... the compensation which
might have been awarded had the shares been evaluated in accordance
with widely recognized international accounting practices. '74 Second, arti-
cle 18, paragraph 2 of the plan, which provides for a National Administra-
tive Commission to fix the exchange values of shares of non-quoted
banks, has several problems which adversely affect the valuation process:
(1) it does not indicate how net profits and assets should be computed;
(2) it does not specify whether goodwill value should be included in net
assets; (3) it does not make any provision for determining whether consol-
idated accounts should be taken into consideration; (4) it makes no state-
ment as to whether assets of banks should be revaluated and their worth
redetermined as of the date the Commission is to decide value; and, (5) it
does not mention what part of net assets should be considered or how net
profits are to be determined.7 5
Additionally, the plan fails to meet the prompt and effective require-
ments. The government of France, in lieu of cash, plans to pay compensa-
tion in state bonds redeemable within a fifteen-year maturity period.76
This time frame may violate the prompt payment requisite under both
the Convention of Establishment and settled principles of international
law. Further, the indemnification scheme inadequately computes the rate
to be paid on the bonds since it neither sets a minimum interest rate nor
establishes protections against depreciation of capital due to monetary
erosion.77 These problems apply equally to the effective requirement,
which is also left unsatisfied because the indemnification plan fails to pro-
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Loyrette & Gaiflot, French Nationalizations and Foreign Banks, INT'L FIN. L. REv.,
June 1982, at 17.
75 Id.
7' Borde & Eggleston, supra note 61, at 426.
77 Loyrette & Gaillot, supra note 74, at 18.
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tect foreign shareholders against currency exchange risks.78
3. The Iranian Claims Cases
Within a short time after the 1979 revolution and the replacement of
the Shah of Iran with the new Islamic government in Iran, numerous U.S.
investment projects were nationalized.7 9 This resulted in scores of law-
suits in U.S. courts against the new revolutionary government. United
States firms asserted that the nationalization of their interests in Iranian
companies constituted an actionable violation of the treaty of Amity, Ec-
onomic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and
Iran8" "because Iran allegedly failed to pay prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation for the nationalized interests."" On January 19, 1981,
the United States and Iran entered into an agreement leading to the sus-
pension of these suits pending resolution of claims by an international
tribunal.8 2
Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations
and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran provides that:
[P]roperty shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be
taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compen-
sation shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the
full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision shall have
been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and
payment thereof.83
Although article IV affords U.S. nationals and companies a basis to
argue that the question of liability and measure of damages are fixed by
the treaty, it does not resolve the problem of how to apply the prompt,
adequate and effective standard. Furthei, it has no provision to offset the
possible depressing effect on value which the expropriatory event or other
government actions may cause. Consequently, the U.S. investor in Iran is
insufficiently protected, and vulnerable to the possibility that Iran will
provide a less than acceptable compensation amount.
78 Id. at 19.
7' Eskridge, The Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a General Theory of Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign States, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 525 (1981).
80 U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29.
8, Eskridge, supra note 79, at 526.
62 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 20 LL.M.
230 (1981).
83 U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29, 8 U.S.T. at 903.
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IlI. A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the effectiveness of the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral
Investment Treaty"4 compensation terms, by comparing them to the
terms used in a typical Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation.8 5
A. Discussion
1. Advantages of the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty In-
demnification Terms
a. Clearer Terms
The terms employed in the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) are clearer than those used in the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (FCN). For example, with regards to the defi-
nition of "adequate," the BIT treaty contains the wording "fair market
value,"' whereas the FCN treaty provides for "full equivalent. '8 7 The
standard of compensation used in the BIT treaty is "prompt, adequate
and freely realizable,"88 which differs from the "prompt, adequate and
effective" standard used in the FCN treaty. 9 As for exchange control re-
quirements, the BIT treaty requires that compensation be "freely trans-
ferable,"90 whereas the FCN treaty merely requires "reasonable provision
for withdrawal."91 Furthermore, the BIT treaty defines "prompt" as "dili-
gently and expeditiously,"9 whereas the FCN treaty contains no similar
provision. These changes provide more specific provisions that should ef-
fectively minimize disputes over the meaning of treaty terms.
b. Greater Legal Protections
In addition to clearer terms, the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment
" U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11.
" U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29. This treaty is being used for illustrative purposes
because of the relevance of the recent Iranian expropriations of U.S. investments. It is also
similar to other Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties concluded by the United
States.
" U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11, 21 LL.M. at 935 (art. HI()).
:7 U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29, 8 U.S.T. at 903 (art. IV(2)).
8 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11, 21 I.L.M. at 935 (art.
uI(1)(d)).
U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29, 8 U.S.T. at 903 (art. IV(2)).
0 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11, 21 I.L.M. at 935 (art. III(1)).
9' U.S.-Iran Treaty, supra note 29, 8 U.S.T. at 905 (art. VII(2)).
92 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11, 21 I.L.M. at 948
(Protocol(5)).
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Treaty offers additional advantages over the U.S.-Iran Treaty. First, it
contains a provision for timing the calculation of compensation so that
indemnification is not adversely affected by the possible depression of
value which the expropriatory event may cause.93 Second, it provides that
compensation must include payments for delay under international law.9 4
Third, it provides that the depriving state may not assert as a defense
that a national or company will receive indemnification from a third
party. 5 This is to protect investment guarantee programs carried out by
the United States. Fourth, it provides for more comprehensive methods
of dispute resolution than does the U.S.-Iran Treaty, including the right
to submit the dispute to the International Center for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes96 and the right to prompt review by the appropriate
judicial or administrative body of the depriving state.9"
c. Encourages Conflict Avoidance and Dispute Resolution at an Early
Stage
The use of clearer terms and the greater availability of dispute reso-
lution mechanisms increases the likelihood that disagreement will be re-
solved at an early stage. This is especially important since specific meth-
ods of valuation are not provided and may assist in minimizing problems
likely to arise when a case by case approach to valuation is taken.
d. Negotiated Specifically for Protection of Foreign Investments
The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty was concluded specifi-
cally for the protection of foreign investments. This is more favorable to
the foreign investor, since the U.S.-Iran Treaty included investment pro-
tection provisions only as part of a much broader treaty purpose.9
2. Disadvantages of the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty In-
demnification Terms
The greatest disadvantage of the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment
Treaty is its failure to satisfactorily address the problem of defining ade-
quate compensation. For instance, although the fair market value at the
date of expropriation is the agreed upon level of compensation, 110 the
93 Id. at 935 (art. 1I(l)).
9 Id.
"' Id. at 940-41 (art. VII(4)).
98 Id. at 939-40 (art. VII(1-3)).
97 Id. at 936 (art. I11(1)).
98 Id. at 928 (preamble).
99 Asken, supra note 5, at 371-72.
100 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 11, 21 I.L.M. at 935 (art HI()).
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treaty does not specify a method to determine this figure. Furthermore,
though the treaty provides compensation for delay under principles of in-
ternational law,10' it does not specify what that amount is or how it
should be determined.
Another difficulty with the treaty is that even though it provides for
prompt review of disputes by the appropriate judicial or administrative
body of the depriving state,102 it does not address the fact that many de-
veloping nations have underdeveloped legal systems which are not capa-
ble of dealing with such questions. s03 In addition, while the terms of rec-
ompense are clearer and provide substantial legal protection to the
foreign investor, there is still a doubt as to how effective the treaty would
be in instances when the depriving state is carrying out a program of ex-
tensive expropriation. Many underdeveloped countries lack sufficient cap-
ital or cash flow to provide the "prompt, adequate and freely realizable"
compensation required by the treaty.'"
B. Reaction to the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty in the
U.S. Business and Political Communities
Despite the difficulties, there appears to be an initial positive re-
sponse from sectors of the U.S. business and political communities. For
example, one international journal has reported that U.S. companies are
now looking more seriously at Egypt as a place of investment.0 5 More-
over, the Reagan Administration is hoping that the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral
Investment Treaty will serve as a prototype for future investment agree-
ments with other developing nations.'01 However, the U.S.-Egypt treaty
has been vigorously attacked by the Egyptian Bar on the ground, among
others, that the expropriation provisions are in conflict with the views of
the developing world. 07 Due to this dispute, the U.S. Department of
State is currently re-negotiating certain terms of the agreement with
Egyptian government officials. 08
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty compensation terms of-
101 Id.
102 Id. at 936 (art. 111(3)).
10" Letter from John A. Westberg to author (May 7, 1983).
104 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
101 Meed News, Oct. 8, 1982, at 17, col. 3.
106 United States, Egypt Sign First Treaty on Bilateral Investments, 18 INT'L TRADE
REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at 17 (1982).
1I Letter from John A. Westberg, supra note 103.
208 Id.
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fer the U.S. investor in Egypt greater legal protection than comparable
indemnification provisions of other U.S. investment treaties. Although
the problems of valuation still persist, the treaty is clear on permissible
and non-permissible government actions and specifically states that com-
pensation must equal the fair market value of the expropriated invest-
ment. Inevitably, disagreements will arise over the application of the
"prompt, effective and freely realizable" formula, but the legal protec-
tions in the treaty should help to effectively minimize and resolve invest-
ment disputes at an early stage. Undoubtedly, the U.S.-Egypt Bilateral
Investment Treaty will serve as a useful prototype for future investment
agreements with other developing nations.
